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Dual-stream modulation failure (DSMF) proposes that dysfunctional regulation of logi-
cal and intuitive decision-making processes by conflict and emotional salience may be
the underlying cognitive mechanism for the formation and maintenance of delusions in
schizophrenia. The present study utilizes a combination of emotionally salient and neutral
stimuli in conflict and non-conflict conditions in a sentence verification task to test spe-
cific hypotheses predicted by the model. Twenty-one patients with schizophrenia and 21
controls completed a sentence verification task with fMRI acquisition.The results are con-
sistent with the predictions based on the conflict modulation component of the model, but
do not support the emotional modulation component of the model.
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INTRODUCTION
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (1)
defines delusions as false beliefs based on incorrect inferences
about external reality that are firmly sustained despite what almost
everybody else believes and despite what constitutes incontro-
vertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. Delu-
sions are one of the cardinal, and most debilitating symptoms
of schizophrenia. While there have been improvements in treat-
ment compliance due to the improved tolerability of atypical
neuroleptics, medications remain partially effective for some and
completely ineffective for others. Further improvements in the
management of schizophrenia will require further advances in
our understanding of the neuropathophysiology of psychosis. The
rapid development of neuroimaging technologies and new models
of human decision-making across the last decade have provided
an opportunity to advance our understanding of the cognitive
and neuropathophysiological basis for psychosis in general and
delusions in particular.
A number of cognitive models have been developed offering
accounts of the emergence and subsequent persistence of delu-
sions in schizophrenia and other psychiatric illnesses. Frith (2,
3) has suggested that a Theory of Mind deficit may underlie the
formation of delusions of reference and persecution. In short, the
inability to adequately discern the thoughts, beliefs, and intentions
of others may lead to the misidentification of malevolence where
none exists. Bentall has suggested that an attributional bias may act
as a self-esteem defense mechanism contributing to the formation
and maintenance of persecutory delusions (4, 5). Here, an individ-
ual maintains self-esteem by minimizing contradictions between
the “actual self” and the “ideal self” by holding others responsi-
ble for negative events (i.e., externalizing and personalizing) and
taking credit for positive events (i.e., internalizing). While the The-
ory of Mind and Attributional Bias accounts have good explana-
tory power for persecutory delusions, and provide an explanation
for the content of these sorts of delusions, they are specific to per-
secutory delusions, rather than providing more general models of
delusions.
The jumping-to-conclusions (JTC) bias (6, 7) and the bias
against disconfirmatory evidence [BADE; (8)] are two comple-
mentary models that offer more general theories of delusions. JTC
describes an aberration in probabilistic reasoning that may con-
tribute to the formation of delusional beliefs. Specifically, arbitrary
inference (9) and a lack of active reality testing (10) may limit the
extent to which an individual seeks out and assesses data, result-
ing in firm decisions being made relatively sooner and on the
basis less evidence than typically seen in healthy controls. Thus,
erroneous beliefs may be readily accepted with minimal evidential
support. BADE can be considered a delusion maintenance model,
highlighting a bias away from evidence that challenges an existing
belief. BADE experiments require the evaluation and re-evaluation
of scenarios or pictures as progressively more explanatory evi-
dence is provided. These studies have consistently shown that,
compared to healthy controls, people with schizophrenia (11, 12)
make less adjustment to their beliefs when confronted with evi-
dence that should result in belief re-evaluation. Some research has
suggested that this effect may be stronger for currently delusional
people (8, 13).
The results for JTC and BADE have proven robust, and have
been identified using a number of variations on the original exper-
imental paradigms. In addition to providing general models of
delusions, an important contribution of this research is that, in
demonstrating these biases using delusion neutral material, it has
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become apparent that these biases represent a more generalized
decision-making deficit that extends beyond the content and con-
text of the delusional belief. Recently, the concept of hypersalience
of evidence-hypothesis (EVH) matches has been put forward
(14, 15) which suggests that the JTC response pattern is caused
by increased impact of currently matching evidence, and that
BADE response pattern is caused by increased impact of previ-
ously matching evidence. However, the issue of which underlying
psychological processes may be affected by hypersalience of EVH
matches, to allow JTC or BADE to occur in the first place, has
not been addressed. We proposed a dual-stream modulation fail-
ure (DSMF) model of delusions (16) that provides a potential
mechanism that can account for the formation and maintenance
of delusions, and the expression of cognitive biases such as JTC
and BADE.
Dual-stream information processing models suggest that judg-
ments are the product of a dynamic interaction between reflexive
(Stream 1) and reflective (Stream 2) decision-making processes
(17). Stream 1 is an automatic form of processing that carries out
intuitive, associative analyses of information, and may be guided
by habit or emotions (18). Stream 2 is more effortful and analytic,
and processes information through logical inferences (18). The
more accessible and intuitive Stream 1 may be responsible for most
of our daily judgments, with conscious, logical Stream 2 serving
to endorse, modify, or reject decisions as appropriate (17, 18).
The DSMF model proposes that the degree to which one stream
is favored over another in a specific situation may be determined
by two modulating factors: conflict and emotional salience (16).
Specifically, a processing conflict may generate a sense of dis-
sonance that may modulate decision-making toward Stream 2,
initiating a more thorough consideration of the available evi-
dence, while emotional salience may tip the balance toward the
more reflexive and intuitive Stream 1 mode of processing. The
diversity of opinions and varying degree of errors displayed by
different individuals considering the same information may stem
from individual differences in the weighting of these two modu-
lators. However, while suboptimal functioning may contribute to
the differences in decision-making that are part of normal human
experience, severe aberrations of the modulators, either individu-
ally or in tandem, may underlie the formation and maintenance of
delusions in schizophrenia. In the DSMF model of delusions, these
two cognitive deficits are described as conflict modulation fail-
ure (CMF) and accentuated emotional modulation (AEM). CMF
suggests that delusions may result from a failure of conflict to ade-
quately modulate decision-making toward Stream 2, diminishing
the influence of contradictory evidence on decision-making and
increasing the likelihood that erroneous, Stream 1 endorsed beliefs
will endure, uncorrected. Psychosis has been associated with an
excessive experience of emotion (19, 20), with delusional schiz-
ophrenia patients inappropriately attaching increased emotional
salience to neutral scenarios (21, 22) or to EVH matches (14).
AEM suggests that, in schizophrenia, an aberrantly AEM toward
reflexive, Stream 1 processing may further diminish the poten-
tially corrective influence of Stream 2 in instances where Stream 1
interpretations are erroneous.
Predicted neuroanatomical correlates of our dual-stream
model of conflict modulation include regions involved in
deliberative, logical reasoning, and regions involved in conflict
detection or resolution. The deliberative functions of Stream 2 are
likely to employ lateral and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex regions.
These regions are consistently implicated in a variety of execu-
tive reasoning tasks, including the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test
(23–27) and the Tower of London test (28, 29), and in both deduc-
tive and inductive reasoning tasks (30–33). The conflict detection
functions that lead to the engagement of Stream 2 are likely to
involve the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC). Past research
has shown that the dACC activates in the presence of cognitive
conflict, for example, when encountering incongruent stimuli in
the Stroop Task (34–36) and the Go/No-Go Task (37). The conflict
modulation arm of the dual-stream modulation model suggests
that the presence of cognitive conflict leads to activation of neural
regions responsible for mediating a bias toward Stream 2 pro-
cessing, increasing the likelihood of a response in keeping with
the available evidence. This proposal is consistent with a number
of theories of dACC function, all of which suggest that, in the
presence of cognitive conflict, the dACC signals to other cortical
regions that adjustments are needed in order to optimize per-
formance (12, 38–42). These other functional networks work to
make adjustments to resolve cognitive conflict, assigning attention
to optimize performance. In accordance with this account, dACC
activation is highest when an incongruent trial follows a congru-
ent (43, 44), and dACC activation for an incongruent trial predicts
increased DLPFC activation in subsequent trials (44). The AEM
arm of the model predicts that emotionally salient stimuli would
attenuate the activity in this network compared to neutral stimuli.
Previously, we presented behavioral data in support of the CMF
arm of the DSMF model (45). Using a simple sentence verification
paradigm that put content believability (a Stream 1 judgment) in
agreement or in conflict with logical validity (a Stream 2 judgment)
we found that the schizophrenia group showed a significantly
greater decrease in performance for the conflict condition com-
pared to the non-conflict condition compared to healthy controls.
The greater number of erroneous, believability led judgments
made by the schizophrenia group when faced with conflict between
believability and logical judgment supports the CMF arm of the
DSMF model.
The current study uses the same sentence verification paradigm
with the addition of neutral and emotionally salient sentences, and
in conjunction with fMRI, to replicate and extend our previous
findings. The objectives are: (1) replicate our previous findings
in support of CMF in schizophrenia. (2) Determine the neuro-
physiological correlates CMF using functional magnetic resonance
imaging. (3) Assess the effects of emotional salience on perfor-
mance and brain activation to seek support for the AEM arm of
the DSMF model. There are three components of the model which
give rise to the following, testable hypotheses.
1. The dual-stream processing component of the model predicts
that for both groups, the conflict condition will be experienced
as more difficult than the non-conflict condition, leading to
more errors for the conflict condition than the non-conflict
condition.
2. The emotional modulation component predicts that for both
groups the emotional stimuli set will lead to more errors for the
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emotional conflict condition compared to the neutral-conflict
condition. The emotional modulation component also predicts
that in regions that are activated by the performance of the
sentence verification task, the emotional conflict condition will
have less activation than the neutral-conflict condition in both
groups. The AEM component predicts that these effects will be
larger in the patients compared to the controls.
3. The conflict modulation component of the model predicts that
for both groups, the conflict condition will result in a greater
number of errors and a greater magnitude of activation com-
pared to the non-conflict condition in the network of brain
regions that subserve Stream 2 processing. The CMF compo-
nent of the model predicts that patients will have a greater
increase in the number of errors for the conflict condition rela-
tive to the non-conflict condition compared to healthy controls.
CMF also predicts that patients will have a smaller increase in
the magnitude of activation in the identified Stream 2 network
for the conflict condition relative to the non-conflict condition
compared to healthy controls.
In addition to these hypotheses that are derived from components
the DSMF models, we anticipate that, consistent with other stud-
ies of cognitive processing in schizophrenia, there will be a general
deficit in performance, characterized by a greater number of errors
in the schizophrenia group compared to the control group for all
conditions.
The primary contrasts of interest for the fMRI data are the
group by task interactions. While the main effects between con-
flict and non-conflict, and the main effects between groups are
expected to be quite robust, the group by task interactions are
anticipated to be much smaller. To minimize the Type II error
that may occur with whole brain correction for multiple compar-
isons when the effects are anticipated to be small, we will perform
a two-stage analysis procedure. In the first stage, a whole brain
analysis will be used to identify the network responsible for the
primary sentence verification task, with stringent controls for mul-
tiple comparisons. In the second stage, the average beta estimates
will be extracted for the magnitude of the response within the
identified region for each condition and each subject, to test for
the interactions of interest within the identified network.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty-one participants with schizophrenia and 21 healthy con-
trol participants were recruited. All were right-handed, between
20 and 58 years of age, were proficient in English (receiving at least
part of their elementary school education and all subsequent edu-
cation in English), and had normal or corrected-to-normal visual
acuity.
Participants in the schizophrenia group were recruited from
inpatient psychiatric units at Vancouver General Hospital and the
University of British Columbia (UBC) Hospital, affiliated outpa-
tient psychiatric programs, and by advertisement in local newspa-
pers. Patients were diagnosed with schizophrenia or schizoaffective
disorder by their hospital or community treating psychiatrist. This
diagnosis was confirmed in a separate diagnostic interview con-
ducted by the investigation psychiatrist (ETN). All patients fulfilled
the DSM-IV criteria for schizophrenia, though three patients also
met the criteria for schizoaffective disorder. Those who met the
DSM-IV criteria for substance abuse and dependence, or had a
history of serious head injury were excluded from participation
in this study. Symptom severity was assessed using the Signs and
Symptoms of Psychotic Illness scale [SSPI; (46)], a symptom scale
comprising 20 items scored 0–4 according to severity. This scale
was administered to all the participants by ETN, a co-developer
of the scale, with the mean total symptom score indicating that
the patient group was in the moderate range of symptom sever-
ity (mean= 9.86, SD= 5.71). As this study was designed to test
a model for the formation and maintenance of aberrant belief
systems, we preferentially selected for schizophrenia patients with
aberrant beliefs. All patients were taking a stable dose of neu-
roleptic medication, defined as no changes in regular dosages of
medication and no requirement for as needed medications in the
4-weeks prior to participation in this study. Twelve participants
in this group were receiving one atypical antipsychotic medica-
tion (clozapine, olanzapine, risperidone, or quetiapine), one was
receiving one typical antipsychotic medication (pipotiazine), and
the remaining eight were receiving one of the following com-
binations of medications: clozapine and lamotrigine; clozapine
and valproic acid; risperidone and valproic acid; risperidone and
quetiapine; quetiapine, ziprasidone and methotrimeprazine; olan-
zapine, quetiapine and divalproex sodium; flupentixol and lithium
carbonate; loxapine and aripiprazole.
Healthy control participants were recruited through public
advertising. In addition to the exclusion criteria for the patients,
controls were also excluded if they were currently being treated for
a psychiatric condition, had a history of any Axis I diagnosis or
had a family history of psychotic illness in a first degree relative.
All participants that took part in the study gave written informed
consent after a full explanation of the study and the procedures it
involved. All experimental procedures were approved by the UBC
Clinical Research Ethics Board.
MATERIALS
Conditional statements were constructed using a single premise
(i.e., “If . . .”) and a single conclusion (i.e., “then . . .”), with each
clause containing a categorical proposition (i.e., all, no, some, some
not), e.g., “If no A’s are B’s, then all B’s are A’s.” Both internal and
external validity were considered when constructing the condi-
tional statements. Internal validity refers to the logical validity
of the whole statement; a deliberative, Stream 2 assessment of
whether or not the conclusion logically follows the premise. Inter-
nal validity is determined by the specific pairing of categorical
propositions used, not the subject matter. “If no A’s are B’s, then
all B’s are A’s,” is logically invalid regardless of whether the subject
pair A and B refers to bank tellers and women (“If no bank tellers
are women, then all women are bank tellers”) or criminals and
rapists (“If no criminals are rapists, then all rapists are criminals”)
as it is constructed using the categorical proposition pair, “no . . .
all.” External validity is the validity of the conclusion independent
from the premise. It can be considered as the “believability” of the
conclusion; an associative, Stream 1 assessment of the consistency
between the conclusion and the participant’s semantic knowledge
base. External validity is a function of both the subject and its
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categorical proposition, e.g., “all women are bank tellers,” is exter-
nally invalid, while, “all rapists are criminals,” is externally valid.
The dissociation between internal validity and external validity
allows for the creation of conditional statements where internal
validity and external validity either conflict (beliefs do not match
logical validity) or agree (i.e., beliefs match logical validity).
Forty neutral stimuli were created from 20 subject pairs that
all participants could be reasonably expected to be familiar with
in terms of believability judgments. Each item was used to create
both a conflict and a non-conflict statement.
An emotionally salient stimuli set was selected using a pilot
questionnaire of 80 emotionally salient statements that was given
to 15 healthy control participants. The statements were of a form
that could be readily translated into two-part conditional sen-
tences (e.g., “Rapists are criminals” could become “If no criminals
are rapists, then no rapists are criminals”). Participants rated each
statement for“valence”(a seven point scale ranging from“Strongly
Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”) and “arousal” (a five point scale
ranging from “low” to “high” arousal). Research using the Self-
Assessment Manikin (47, 48) has shown that the most emotionally
salient stimuli are those that are rated at the extremes for both
valence and arousal, with increases in ratings on one scale gener-
ally corresponding to increases in the ratings for the other. For this
study we operationalized “emotional salience” as the sum of the
ratings for valence and arousal, with the most emotionally salient
items being considered those with the highest summed score. The
20 items with the highest emotional salience score across all par-
ticipants were selected to create 40 stimuli, with each item being
used to create a conflict and a non-conflict statement.
PROCEDURE
Prior to participation in the task, all participants were screened
for safety for high-field MRI in accordance with the guidelines of
the UBC High-Field MRI Center, provided informed consent, and
completed an assessment battery consisting of the National Adult
Reading Test (NART) (49) as a proxy for premorbid IQ, and the
Ammons Quick Test [QUICK; (50)] as a proxy for current IQ.
A training session was given on a laptop computer to familiarize
participants with the conditional reasoning task and its timing.
Instructions were given making it clear that determinations of
logical validity related to the internal validity of the statements.
When it was clear that the task was understood (operationalized
as six of eight neutral exemplars being answered correctly), the
experimental phase was initiated.
Participants underwent fMRI scanning while determining the
logical validity of conditional sentences constructed as described
in detail above. Responses were given by pressing one of two but-
tons to indicate whether conditional sentences were logically valid
or logically invalid. Each trial began with a 3-s presentation of the
“If”clause, followed by presentation of the whole“If . . . then”state-
ment for a maximum of 9 s further. When a response was given,
via button press, the statement was replaced with a crosshair for 3,
4, or 5 s. Trials were separated by crosshair presentation regardless
of whether a response was given or not.
The study comprised four runs of 20 conditional sentences for
a total of 80 conditional sentences. Forty were neutral stimuli and
40 emotionally salient. Of each 40, 20 were conflict stimuli and 20
were non-conflict stimuli. Each of the four runs was balanced for
conflict status, salience, and internal validity. Five null periods of
15, 16, or 17 s occurred randomly across each run. The inclusion
of null events provides trial-free periods, allowing baseline levels
of activation to be attained (51).
IMAGE ACQUISITION AND PROCESSING
Echo-planar images were collected on a Philips Achieva 3.0-T
scanner, equipped with a SENSE coil. Conventional spin-echo
T1-weighted sagittal localizers were used to view head posi-
tion and to graphically prescribe the functional image volumes.
Functional image volumes sensitive to the blood-oxygen-level-
dependent (BOLD) contrast signal were collected with a gra-
dient echo sequence (TR/TE 2000/30 ms, 90°flip angle, FOV
216 mm× 143 mm× 240 mm (AP, FH, RL), 3.00 mm slice thick-
ness, 1 mm slice gap, and 36 axial slices). Functional images
were reconstructed offline. Statistical Parametric Mapping soft-
ware (SPM5, Wellcome Institute of Cognitive Neurology) was
used for image reorientation, realignment, normalization into
Montreal Neurological Institute space, and smoothing with a
Gaussian kernel (8 mm full width at half maximum) to com-
pensate for inter-participant anatomical differences and optimize
the signal-to-noise ratio. Images and movement parameters were
screened for potential movement artifacts prior to data analysis.
No excessive head movement (>2 mm) was observed in any of the
participants.
DATA ANALYSIS
Between groups analyses of demographic and IQ measures
were carried out using two sample t -tests, with a Chi-Square
goodness-of-fit test for sex.
In addition to the specific t -test corresponding to our a priori
hypotheses, the behavioral data (response accuracy) was analyzed
using a 2× 2× 2 analyses of variance (ANOVA) (SPSS 12.0 for
Windows, SSPS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA). A trial was recorded
as an error if either an incorrect response was given or no
response was given before the beginning of the next trial. The
independent variables were group (healthy controls and partici-
pants diagnosed with schizophrenia), conflict status (conflict and
non-conflict conditionals), and salience (neutral and emotionally
salient). The dependent variable was response accuracy (percent-
age of correct responses). Additional t -tests were carried out to
determine whether the difference between conditions (conflict
minus non-conflict) was significantly different between groups
for both neutral and emotionally salient stimuli. Statistical tests for
behavioral and functional imaging data were one-tailed, reflecting
the directional nature of our hypotheses.
fMRI data analysis comprised three stages: (1) the task related
BOLD response was estimated using a set of 10 finite impulse
response (FIR) functions (52, 53) corresponding to the 10 repeti-
tion times (20 s) immediately following the presentation of each
“If . . .” statement. FIR models make no a priori assumptions with
regards to the shape and time course of hemodynamic response
functions, and thus, avoid errors associated with ill-fitting canon-
ical models (54). (2) The beta estimates for the FIR models were
brought forward for a second level analysis to identify the net-
works of brain regions that showed significant activity during task
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performance (t = 7.94, p= 0.00001, corrected for multiple com-
parisons). To avoid a group or condition bias, this analysis was
performed on all participants (both patients and controls) for all
conditions combined. (3) The beta estimates for each FIR func-
tion for each voxel within the identified network were extracted
for each participant for each stimulus type. The mean beta esti-
mates for time bins four to six were calculated for each subject
and each stimulus type and used as dependent variables to test our
specific hypotheses as well as in a 2× 2× 2 (group by conflict sta-
tus by salience) ANOVAs. Time bins four through six were chosen
to maximize the signal-to-noise ratio as a review of the observed
BOLD response indicated that the peak BOLD response occurred
during this period for both groups and both conditions (Figure 1).
Bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated using
performance on the conflict condition and mean beta values for
the conflict condition to test whether there was a positive corre-
lation between success on the conflict condition and amount of
activity for the whole task activation network.
RESULTS
SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS
The mean duration of illness for the patient group was 15.67 years
(SD 10.89 years) (Table 1). The mean total score on the SSPI was
9.86 (SD 5.71). Sixteen of the 21 patients endorsed aberrant beliefs;
of these 16, five had severe delusions (SSPI delusions score= 4), six
had definite delusions (SSPI delusions score= 3), and five exhib-
ited unrealistic beliefs bordering on delusions (SSPI delusions
score of 1 or 2).
There were no significant between groups differences in
age [t (40)=−0.238, p= 0.81], sex [χ2 (1, N = 40)= 0.00,
p= 1.00], QUICK scores [t (40)= 1.109, p= 0.27], or NART
scores [t (40)= 0.09, p= 0.93]. There was a significant between
groups difference for years of education [t (40)= 1.996, p= 0.05].
However, there were no significant correlations between years
of education and performance (percentage answered correctly)
for either group [Controls: r(21)=−0.093, p= 0.688; Sz:
r(21)= 0.133, p= 0.566].
FIGURE 1 |Above: regions of activation for the mask of task related
activity. Below: Finite Impulse Response (FIR) basis set (10 time bins) for the
mask of task related activity, indicating the peak hemodynamic response
occurring during time bin five, and the three time bins used for beta estimate
extraction (bins four through six). Both activations and the FIR basis set
present data for both groups.
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BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
ANOVA main effects and interactions: behavioral data
The mean group performance (percentage of conditional state-
ments answered correctly) for all conditions is shown in Figure 2.
The 2× 2× 2 (group by salience by conflict status) ANOVA indi-
cated highly significant main effects of group (F 1, 160= 32.25,
p < 0.001) and conflict status (F 1, 160= 32.25, p < 0.001), with a
significant interaction of group by conflict status (F 1, 160= 7.17,
p < 0.01). There was no significant main effect of salience
(p= 0.21) and no significant interactions of group by salience
(p= 0.75), salience by conflict status (p= 0.88), or group by
salience by conflict status (p= 0.66).
T-tests for specified a priori hypotheses: behavioral data
Consistent with the general deficits across wide cognitive
domains reported for schizophrenia, the control group per-
formed significantly better than the schizophrenia group for
all four conditions: neutral [t (20)= 3.54, p < 0.001], affective
[t (20)= 3.45, p < 0.001], non-conflict [t (20)= 2.96, p < 0.005],
conflict [t (20)= 3.33, p < 0.001].
Consistent with dual-stream processing, both groups per-
formed better for the non-conflict condition compared to the
conflict condition: patients [t (20)= 4.18, p= 0.0002], controls
[t (20)= 4.40, p= 0.0001].
Contrary to the emotional modulation model there were no
significant differences between (affective-conflict errors – neutral-
conflict errors) for either group: patients [t (20)= 0.35, p= 0.36],
controls [t (20)= 1.30, p= 0.11].
Contrary to the AEM model, patients did not show a greater dif-
ference for affective-conflict errors minus neutral-conflict errors
compared to controls: patient difference= 2.6 errors, control
difference= 3.1 errors [t (20)= 0.55, p= 0.29].
Consistent with CMF, the patients had a significantly greater
difference in the number of errors for (conflict errors – non-
conflict errors) compared to controls: patients made 17.3 more
errors for the conflict condition than the non-conflict condi-
tion compared to controls, who only made 6.4 more errors
[t (20)= 2.52, p= 0.01].
FUNCTIONAL IMAGING RESULTS
Performance of the conditional sentence task significantly acti-
vated a network of 3664 voxels (Figure 1). The location and
magnitude of local peaks as well as the extent of the subclusters
that comprise this network are listed in Table 2. The mean magni-
tude of the activation within the network for each condition and
each group are shown in Table 3.
ANOVA main effects and interactions: fMRI data
The 2× 2× 2 (group by salience by conflict status) ANOVA
of mean beta estimates (time bins four through six) showed
a significant main effect of group, with greater activity for the
healthy control group than schizophrenia group [controls= 0.045
(SD= 0.015), patients= 0.038 (SD= 0.015); (F 1, 160)= 10.24,
p < 0.01], and a main effect of salience, with greater activ-
ity for affective compared to neutral stimuli [neutral= 0.039
(SD= 0.015), affective= 0.044 (SD= 0.016); (F 1, 160)= 4.93,
p < 0.05]. There was a trend toward significance for conflict status,
Table 1 | Sociodemographic and psychopathological group
characteristics.
Healthy
controls
(n=21)
Schizophrenia
(n=21)
t -Value p-Value
Age (years) 33.86 (10.76) 34.67 (11.25) −0.238 0.813
Sex (M:F) 14:7 14:7 0.000 1.000
Education (years) 15.24 (2.23) 13.76 (2.55) 1.996 0.053
NART (IQ) 118.86 (4.88) 119 (5.34) −0.090 0.928
QUICK (IQ) 109.9 (10.47) 105.6 (14.2) 1.109 0.274
Illness duration (years) n/a 15.67 (10.89)
SSPI (delusions) n/a 2.14 (1.56)
SSPI (total) n/a 9.86 (5.71)
Mean values, with SD in parentheses are presented.
FIGURE 2 |The mean percentage of correct responses by group (HC,
healthy control; Sz, schizophrenia), conflict status (conflict and
non-conflict), and salience (affective and neutral). Error bars show
standard error of the mean (SEM). All between-group comparisons were
statistically significant.
with greater activity for conflict stimuli than non-conflict [con-
flict= 0.043 (SD= 0.016), non-conflict= 0.039 (SD= 0.015);
(F 1,160)= 3.37, p= 0.068], and a trend for the interaction between
conflict status and salience [(F 1, 160)= 3.66, p= 0.057].
T-tests for specified a priori hypotheses: fMRI data
Consistent with decreased performance being associated with
decreased activity across diverse cognitive tasks in schizophrenia,
patients showed a general decrease in activity in the identified net-
work compared to patients for all four conditions combined. The
mean beta estimate of activity for the controls was 0.044 compared
to 0.038 for the patients [t (20)= 1.75, p= 0.037].
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Table 2 | Localization of activations for task related activation clusters
[voxels showing significant activity (t =7.94, p=0.00001, family wise
error (FWE) correction for multiple comparisons), irrespective of
group, and across both conditions].
Cluster name Peak MNI
coordinates
(x, y, z)
Voxels t p
Occipital cortex/parietal lobules 24, −100, −4 2160 20.99 0.000
Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 0, 16, 48 290 16.54 0.000
Prefrontal cortex/striatum −20, 8, −4 803 14.26 0.000
Insula/striatum 32, 24, −4 292 12.76 0.000
Prefrontal cortex 56, 28, 24 76 12.16 0.000
Precentral cortex 32, 0, 52 31 10.4 0.000
Hippocampus 24, −28, −4 9 9.47 0.000
Inferior frontal operculum 60, 16, 4 1 8.45 0.000
Hippocampus −24, −32, −4 1 8.26 0.000
Fusiform gyrus 44, −28, −16 1 8.12 0.000
Table 3 | Mean beta estimates of the magnitude of activation± the
standard error of the mean for each condition for patients and
controls.
Condition Controls Patients
Neutral non-conflict 0.036±0.003 0.033±0.003
Neutral conflict 0.047±0.003 0.039±0.003
Affective non-conflict 0.047±0.003 0.041±0.003
Affective conflict 0.049±0.003 0.038±0.004
In contrast to the predicted decrease in activity for affective-
conflict stimuli compared to neutral-conflict stimuli (outlined in
the emotional modulation component of the model), there was no
significant difference in the activation between these conditions
in either group controls affective-conflict beta= 0.049, neutral-
conflict beta= 0.046, t (20)= 0.53, p= 0.60; patients affective-
conflict beta= 0.038, neutral-conflict beta= 0.039, [t (20)= 0.50,
p= 0.62]. The greater decrement in activation for affective-
conflict stimuli in patients compared to controls predicted by
the AEM arm of the model was not observed [difference in
controls=−0.002, difference in patients= 0.001, t (20)= 1.35,
p= 0.19].
Consistent with conflict modulation, both groups showed
greater activation for conflict stimuli compared to non-
conflict stimuli [controls: conflict= 0.048, non-conflict 0.042,
t (20)= 4.78, p < 0.001; patients: conflict= 0.039, non-conflict
0.037, t (20)= 2.1, p= 0.05]. Consistent with CMF, controls
showed a significantly greater increase in activity for the conflict
condition relative to the non-conflict condition than did patients
[control difference (conflict minus non-conflict)= 0.006, patient
difference= 0.002, t (20)= 2.42, p= 0.01].
The schizophrenia group showed significant correlations
between performance on the conflict condition and BOLD activ-
ity associated with the conflict condition for the entire network
[r(21)= 0.422; p < 0.05; Figure 3]. There was no significant cor-
relation for the healthy control group [r(21)=−0.04; p= 0.432].
FIGURE 3 | Correlations between performance on the conflict
condition and the mean beta values for the conflict condition for the
whole mask. The schizophrenia group showed a significant correlation
[r (21)=0.422; p<0.05, blue line]; the healthy control group displayed
uniformly high level of performance [r (21)=−0.04; p=0.432, green line].
DISCUSSION
The DSMF model of delusions suggests two processing aberrations
that may contribute to delusion formation and maintenance in
schizophrenia: a failure of cognitive conflict to adequately increase
deliberative, Stream 2 processing (CMF) and an AEM away from
Stream 2 and toward non-deliberative, Stream 1 processing. These
modulation deficits may occur in tandem or separately, leading to
an under-recruitment of Stream 2 processing and/or an increase
in (or relative failure to suppress) Stream 1 processing. This creates
a cognitive environment were erroneous, intuitive beliefs are more
likely to be endorsed, and then endure, despite minimal evidential
support.
The data presented replicate and extend previous findings in
support of the conflict arm of the DSMF model. The inter-
ference of believability with assessments of logical validity is a
well-documented phenomenon in healthy controls (32, 55–57).
This replication is neither novel nor surprising in that the expe-
rience of dissonance resulting from such conflicts are common
occurrences in everyday life. Single stream processors, such as
computers, attempting reasoning tasks using logic or set theory
would not require additional time or resources to solve the task if
there was a conflict between the logical solution and “knowledge”
residing on its hard drive. The proposed dual-stream modulation
model provides a potential cognitive mechanism that accounts
for this commonly experienced interference in humans. CMF
predicts that this effect will be exaggerated in people diagnosed
with schizophrenia (16, 45). As in our previous study (45), the
schizophrenia group exhibited a further deficit in performance
for the conflict condition that went above and beyond the gen-
eral performance deficit reflected in the group difference for the
non-conflict condition.
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Similar to the previous study (45) the control group had more
years of education than the schizophrenic group. The difference
in years of education between groups is likely a consequence of
illness interrupting education in the schizophrenia group, such
that the well-established cognitive deficits associated with schizo-
phrenia may have directly contributed to the differences in years
of education. Matching the samples on years of education would
require one of the groups to be non-representative (i.e., either
highly educated patients or poorly educated controls), and may
not be an appropriate strategy for the schizophrenia group if
years of education is a dependent variable for this group. How-
ever, in the syllogism literature, years of education and IQ do
correlate with performance in healthy controls, and so the dif-
ference in years of education cannot be ruled out as a con-
tributing factor to the group difference in performance in the
current study where the schizophrenia group performed worse
than healthy controls for both conditions. While years of edu-
cation may improve general formal logical reasoning skills, it is
less clear how years of education would correspond to a specific
enhancement in the ability to inhibit belief-biased responding
in the conflict condition. Belief-incongruence is considered the
source of decreased performance between conditions where syllo-
gisms are formally identical, but populated with content varying
in believability. The greater drop in performance for the schizo-
phrenia group for conflict compared to non-conflict conditions
suggests a greater susceptibility to the belief-bias effect, in addi-
tion to a general performance deficit. This finding is consistent
with CMF.
This study extends previous behavioral findings by providing
neurophysiological data consistent with the processing differences
predicted by CMF. As expected for a cognitively demanding task,
participants demonstrated a central executive network (CEN)
(58, 59)/task-positive functional network (60)/multiple demands
network (61) pattern of activation, consistent with other stud-
ies utilizing deductive reasoning paradigms [e.g., (62–64)], and
including nodes associated with both conflict processing (dACC)
and deliberative reasoning (L/DLPFC). Consistent with conflict
modulation, namely, an increase in deliberative processing when
presented with a conflict stimulus (12, 38–42, 65), the healthy
control group showed a significant increase in activity in this net-
work for the conflict condition compared to the non-conflict. A
significantly smaller increase was observed in the schizophrenia
group, consistent with research demonstrating attenuated dACC
activity for schizophrenia patients in response to conflict stimuli
in the Stroop task (35) and for error commission in the Go/No-
Go task (66). Within the conflict arm of the model, the increase in
activity for the conflict condition may represent enhanced engage-
ment of Stream 2 processes when faced with cognitive conflict.
The increase in activity for the conflict condition is not due to
increase complexity of the logic component of the task. The logic
component of the task is exactly the same for both conflict and
non-conflict conditions. The observed increase in activity is due
to the presence of the conflict between Stream 1 and Stream
2 processes. The failure of the schizophrenia group to enhance
activity in this network to the same degree as healthy controls
may be the physiological basis for the greater decrease in perfor-
mance for the conflict condition displayed by the schizophrenia
group. The interpretation that an increase in CEN activity when
confronted with cognitive conflict corresponds to an increase in
Stream 2 processing that reduces the likelihood of believabil-
ity led errors is further supported by the positive correlation
between the magnitude of activity in this network and task per-
formance for the conflict condition in the schizophrenia group.
The absence of a significant correlation in the healthy controls
reflects the high level of performance or ceiling effect in this
group.
This is the first study investigating the AEM arm of the
DSMF model. AEM predicts that emotions modulate decision-
making toward Stream 1 in both groups and that this modula-
tor effect is accentuated in the schizophrenia group. Emotional
modulation should lead to more errors for affective-conflict con-
dition compared to neutral-conflict conditions in both schizo-
phrenia and control groups. AEM predicts that this difference
would be larger for the schizophrenia group than the control
group. The model further predicts that emotional modulation
would attenuate the neurophysiological network that subserves
Stream 2 processing for the affect-conflict condition relative to the
neutral-conflict condition for both groups and that this atten-
uation would be accentuated in the schizophrenia group. In
this study, emotional salience did not lead to further decreased
performance for the conflict condition in either group. Con-
trary to our predictions of decreased activity in Stream 2 net-
works, both groups showed increased activity in the identified
network for the emotional-salient stimuli compared to neutral
stimuli.
These results suggest either that the “emotional salience leads
to decreased performance for the conflict condition” arm of the
AEM model is incorrect, or the stimuli set was not suitable to test
emotional modulation. The affective stimuli set in our study was
selected in piloting via subjective ratings of arousal and salience. It
is possible that these stimuli were not sufficiently personally salient
or arousing enough to induce the anticipated effect. A sufficient
threshold of intensity may need to be exceeded before the effect
will be seen, particularly as increased cognitive demands are asso-
ciated with decreases in activity in regions of the brain associated
with processing affect [e.g., (67, 68)].
CONCLUSION
The current results provide further behavioral support for both
conflict modulation in healthy controls and CMF in schizophre-
nia. Additionally, this study indicates that conflict modulation
toward Stream 2 processing may be associated with an increase
in CEN activity, which includes regions previously identified as
involved in conflict detection and deliberative processing (i.e.,
dACC and frontal cortex). CMF in schizophrenia may be the
result of a failure to adequately engage this network, increasing the
likelihood of erroneous judgments when faced with belief-logic
conflicts.
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